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Following recent developments in the asset pricing lit-
erature on geographic concentration, we complement
classic theories based on information asymmetry and
explain the short-run performance of real estate invest-
ment trust (REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs) through
an investor base mechanism. We analyze the U.S. mar-
ket and show that issuers are more likely to under-
price when a REIT is more geographically concentrated.
In particular, by adopting an identification strategy of
pre- and post-IPO returns, we find evidence for an
investor base channel rather than a diversification dis-
count channel. In addition, geographic portfolio concen-
tration has a stronger impact on the initial returns of
REIT IPOs than property type concentration. Finally, we
find that lower deadweight costs at the time of an IPO
weaken the influence of geographic concentration on
initial returns. Our results are robust to the firm’s geo-
graphic concentration in economically defined regions,
different measures of deadweight costs, the control of
information environment of the portfolio and headquar-
ters markets, and to controlling for the REIT’s property
type focus.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the extent towhich the location and concentration of a company’s underlying
assets affect its initial public offering (IPO) valuation usingU.S. real estate investment trust (REIT)
data. Although the asset type concentration of public companies has been extensively explored,
studies on the geography of firm assets have been limited by a lack of data (Bernile, Kumar, &
Sulaeman, 2015; García & Norli, 2012). The regulatory environment and corporate governance of
U.S.-listed real estate companies allow us to accurately measure the level of asset and geographic
portfolio concentration.
The IPO short-run performance is notably different for real estate companies and tends to show
significantly lower, and sometimes negative, underpricing compared to industrial firms. In this
study, we argue that widely accepted theories of IPO underpricing based on information asym-
metry are often unable to explain IPO performance in the real estate industry. The unique char-
acteristics of an equity REIT,1 specifically its real asset holdings, play an important role in its IPO
valuation. We find that the geographic concentration of a REIT’s initial property portfolio better
explains its IPO performance than traditional theories based on asymmetric information.
Much of the limited literature on the initial returns of real estate IPOs is focused on why they
are, on average, much lower than the first-day returns of industrial IPOs. For example, we find
a 3.5% average initial return (with a standard deviation of 9.2%) for the 183 IPOs in our broad
sample from 1995 to 2017, with a minimum of –13.2% and a maximum of 45.8%. In contrast, the
average initial return of U.S. industrial IPOs is 17.9% between 1980 and 2018 (Ritter, 2018). Using
the same sample period as our study, Marcato, Milcheva, and Zheng (2018) record an even higher
initial return of 24.0% for U.S. industrial IPOs. This study investigates the determinants of varia-
tion in IPO valuations within the REIT industry, focusing on the unique characteristics of public
real estate companies, including their underlying real asset portfolio holdings. In particular, our
study extends the literature on the impact of underlying real assets on REITs IPO performance
via a geographic concentration channel. We build on two strands of the literature: the effect of
concentration or diversification on firm performance and real estate IPO valuation. We propose a
new valuation approach for real estate IPOs, which does not require the assumption of informa-
tion asymmetry.
Commercial real estate (CRE) markets are decidedly local in nature, which may provide an
information advantage to firms and individuals who invest time and resources to obtain local
market knowledge (Ling, Naranjo, & Scheick, 2018; Vannieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009). Fur-
thermore, most real estate companies focus their portfolios on one, or a few, property type with a
clear description of their concentration strategy disseminated to investors prior to their IPO. These
concentrated investment strategies, in addition to greater homogeneity in firm structure and cor-
porate governance than most other industries, make REITs a suitable laboratory to disentangle
the effects of geographic concentration on IPO initial returns from other cross-firm characteristics
(Hartzell, Sun, & Titman, 2014).
Overall, we find that geographic concentration strategies have a significant impact on the IPO
valuation of REITs. This result is robust to alternative regression specifications, to controlling for
the property type focus of the REIT, and to controlling for variation in the information environ-
ment of the markets in which the IPO firm’s properties are located and the market in which the
firm is headquartered.
1 Equity REITs mainly invest in private real estate as opposed to mortgage REITs, which invest in mortgage debt.
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Our contributions to the literature are fourfold. First, we find empirical evidence thatmore geo-
graphically concentrated REITs experience higher IPO initial returns. We propose both a primary
and an alternative channel through which property asset locations could affect the IPO valuation.
The primary channel is built on theMerton (1987) investor base argument and is closely related to
the findings of García and Norli (2012). Merton (1987) argues that stocks with less investor recog-
nition must offer higher expected returns to compensate investors for increased risk. García and
Norli (2012) study the geographic concentration of corporate business activities and show that
“local” firms have smaller investor bases and higher stock returns to compensate investors for
the concentrated risk of their asset portfolios. As sufficient interest from investors (i.e., IPO sub-
scription) is a key to the success of an IPO (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Rock,
1986), we argue that more geographically focused firms have less investor recognition; therefore,
issuers and underwriters need to underprice shares to attract sufficient awareness and participa-
tion from investors. Although information asymmetry-based theories are unable to explain the
negative initial returns sometimes observed for REIT IPOs, the investor base argument does not
assume the existence of information asymmetry and can also account for IPO overpricing. This is
particularly relevant for the real estate industry where governance is very transparent and asset-
level information is widely available.
Second, we confirm that geographic location impacts IPO valuations via the investor base chan-
nel rather than the alternative diversification discount channel. A large corporate finance litera-
ture focuses on the impact of asset concentration on asset valuations as well as returns across dif-
ferent industries and consistently finds support for the existence of a diversification discount.2 In
otherwords, higher expected returns are required by investors to compensate for the increased risk
associatedwith focused strategies (Montgomery, 1994). In a real estate context, the negative effects
of diversification across property types are well-documented by Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans
(2003), Cronqvist, Högfeldt, and Nilsson (2001), and Capozza and Seguin (1999). The diversifica-
tion discount (or concentration premium) argument suggests that more geographically concen-
trated REITs should experience higher initial returns due to higher required returns by investors
after the listing. However, Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that IPOs are one-off agency-based
events in which initial returns are heavily dependent on the valuation of the IPO by underwrit-
ers and investors. Therefore, fundamental market valuation, asset pricing, and liquidity theories
based on risk profiles are unlikely to explain short-run performance. Our findings support this
argument as we only identify a significant impact of geographic concentration on the pricing of
IPOs prior to the beginning of trading.
Third,we identify amoderating effect of the deadweight costs associatedwith aREIT IPOon the
relationship between the geographic concentration of underlying properties and IPO valuation.
Chan,Wang, and Yang (2009) argue that tangible andmarketable real estate holdings give entities
more bargaining powerwhen they go public. If IPO companies can sell real estate portfolios/assets
quickly and cost effectively in the parallel private commercial real estate market, issuers have less
incentive to underprice shares. Should an IPO fail (i.e., be undersubscribed), the assets can be
sold in the well-functioning private CRE market. Thus, when the deadweight cost of the IPO is
relatively low, the impact of geographic concentration on IPO valuation is moderated. We are
the first to empirically test this moderating effect and find evidence that when companies can
liquidate properties quickly and cost effectively, the negative effect of geographic concentration
on IPO initial returns is weakened.
2 See, for example, Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010).
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Finally, this study is the first to use a more precise method of calculating an IPO firm’s geo-
graphic concentration and to test its impact on corporate finance activities. Despite the varying
effects that a concentration strategy may have on a company’s performance and the mechanisms
through which these effects are transmitted, measuring the (geographic) concentration of a com-
pany’s business activities is not straightforward. Although a growing literature investigates the
role of geographic factors in corporate activities, these studies typically measure geographic prox-
imity or dispersion based on the location of the companies’ headquarters relative to their investors
rather than on the locations of the firm’s actual business activities or assets (García & Norli,
2012). Real estate companies with tangible, immovable, and relatively easy to value assets offer
the opportunity to examine the geographic dimensions of corporate finance issues and the abil-
ity to construct measures of geographic concentration based on the holdings of physical assets in
different locations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the
literature on IPO underpricing and its usefulness in explaining REIT IPO performance. We also
develop our testable hypotheses in this section. Section 3 presents a detailed description of our
sample selection, variable construction, and estimation methodology. We discuss our results and
robustness tests in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 LITERATURE REVIEWANDHYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Ibbotson (1975) first brought attention to the underpricing of IPOs, an anomaly that has been
observed across multiple industries and countries (Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994). Explana-
tions for underpricing in the well-developed IPO literature can be generally categorized into two
groups: information asymmetry-based theories and behavioral arguments (Ritter &Welch, 2002).
The former posits that issuers, underwriters, and investors have varying amounts of information
about the intrinsic value of an IPO. Therefore, for the success of the offering, underpricing is
required by the relatively uninformed investors to compensate them for their perceived informa-
tion disadvantage relative to informed investors in the IPO. The greater the level of the information
asymmetry surrounding an IPO, the higher is the underpricing (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Beaty &
Ritter, 1986; Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1989). In the
absence of information asymmetry, the IPO offer price would be set to produce a zero (market-
adjusted) return on the first day of trading.
Despite the substantial theoretical and empirical literature on IPO underpricing for indus-
trial companies, real estate and, more generally, financial IPOs are underresearched as they are
normally excluded from general IPO studies. Nevertheless, the literature on real estate IPOs is
evolving with the recent growth of listed real estate markets across the world. The interest in
this specific industry is partially attributable to the relatively low level of average IPO underpric-
ing; moreover, overpricing is observed, on average, during some sample periods. For example,
Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) find an average initial return of –2.82% (i.e., overpricing) for U.S.
REIT IPOs between 1971 and 1988. Chan, Chen, and Wang (2013) refer to these overpricing peri-
ods as “a puzzle within the puzzle.”3 After 1990, average initial returns turned positive (Ling &
Ryngaert, 1997), but remained substantially lower than industrial IPOs. More recently, U.S. REIT
IPOs experienced negative initial returns oncemore during the 2007–2010 financial crisis (Bairagi
& Dimovski, 2011). Several studies focused on real estate IPOs in other markets, such as Australia,
3 See Chan, Chen, and Wang (2013) for a detailed literature review of real estate IPO studies.
LING et al. 5
Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore. and Europe, also find abnormally low initial returns, with
several companies reporting negative returns (Brounen & Eichholtz, 2002; Dimovski & Brooks,
2006; Londerville, 2002; Wong, Ong, & Ooi, 2013). Because information asymmetry-based theo-
ries are unable to account for negative initial returns, we adopt a new theoretical approach that
supports and partly explains this phenomenon.
Wang et al. (1992) suggest that the unique features of listed real estate companies, such as their
pre-1992 fund-like structure, the low involvement of institutional investors, and their tangible
underlying real assets, offer a plausible explanation for overpricing. However, in the late 1980s,
U.S. REITs started to function more as operating companies than passive investment vehicles,
such as closed-end funds (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). Thus, the (closed-end) fund-like structure of
early REITs cannot explain the negative initial returns observed during the most recent financial
crisis (2007–2010).
In the late 1980s, the U.S. REIT sector also saw a significant increase in the presence of insti-
tutional investors. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) argue that the shift from pre-1990 negative initial
returns to positive returns in the early-to-mid 1990s was due to the increased uncertainty of IPO
valuations introduced by a growing number of institutional investors in the REITmarket. Accord-
ing to Ling and Ryngaert (1997), the involvement of institutional investors in REIT IPOs was sim-
ilar to industrial IPOs in the 1990s; however, the average 3.6% underpricing reported by Ling and
Ryngaert (1997) was still considerably lower than the average underpricing of industrial IPOs.4
To examine the influence of underlying real assets on IPO pricing, Chan, Stohs, and Wang
(2001) compare the initial returns of 56 real estate operating companies’ (REOCs) IPOs in Hong
Kong with 343 non-real estate IPOs over the period 1986–1997 and find no significant difference.
Therefore, they argue that portfolios of tangible real estate assets do not explain the unusual
IPO performance of real estate companies. However, unlike U.S. equity REITs, the assets of most
real estate operating companies are not primarily investment properties; rather, many REOCs are
involved in the real estate development and service businesses. Thus, their findings do not elim-
inate the potential influence of underlying real asset holdings on the IPO return performance.
Marcato, Stanimira, and Zheng (2018) argue that the geographic location of underlying assets
matters to real estate IPO valuations as it links the regional economic conditions to the corporate
performance.
Furthermore, the findings of Chan et al. (2001) do not hold in other real estate markets. For
example, Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) find an average IPO initial return for U.K. and French
property companies of 4.1% and 0.8%, respectively, over their 1984–1999 sample period. In contrast,
Levis (1995) observes an average underpricing of 14.2% for industrial IPOs from 1980 to 1988 in
the United Kingdom, whereas Derrien and Womack (2003) report an average underpricing in
the French IPO market of 13.2% between 1992 and 1998. Although the sample periods in these
comparison studies vary, the consistent differences between REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs on
average initial-day returns are too large to ignore. Therefore, we argue that evidence on the impact
of underlying real assets on the IPO performance of real estate companies remains inconclusive
and worthy of further investigation.
Our study fills a gap in the literature by examining the potential influence of underlying asset
holdings on IPO performance through a geographic concentration channel. In addition, we pro-
pose a new explanation for why the nature of a REIT’s assets affects IPO valuations. The impact of
the geographic locations of a firm’s real estate assets on business activities and performance has
received increasing attention in the general finance literature. However, studies on the impact
4 According to table 1 in Ritter (2018), the average underpricing for U.S. industrial IPOs from 1991 to 1994 was above 10%.
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of geographic concentration remain scarce due to data availability. García and Norli (2012) ana-
lyze the geographic concentration of corporate business activities by using the number of times
a state’s name is mentioned in a firm’s 10-K report to proxy for the geographic dispersion of a
firm’s business interest. They find that companies with more geographically concentrated busi-
ness activities have less investor recognition, hence higher expected (and realized) returns. This
supports the investor recognition argument by Merton (1987), which may also play a key role in
the success of an IPO because it directly influences the subscription process. Following these two
streams of literature, we formulate our first hypothesis: more geographically concentrated REITs
have a greater need to underprice IPOs in order to overcome a lack of investor recognition and to
obtain sufficient subscriptions. More specifically:
Hypothesis 1: REITs with more geographically concentrated underlying assets experience
higher IPO initial returns.
As previously discussed, diversification stock price discounts have been documented in multi-
ple industries. Montgomery (1994) suggests that diversification across assets does not positively
affect firm performance and, in fact, it may reduce expected returns by decreasing the invest-
ment risk. Therefore, a concentrated portfolio strategy is normally associated with a return pre-
mium. A growing literature examines how investment and corporate activities are influenced by
the geographic location of a firm’s assets and business interests, including geographic concentra-
tion. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document that investors prefer firms with headquarters in the
citywheremanagers live. Similar “home bias” results suggest that investing in local firms provides
investors with informational advantages.5 For example, Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009) find that
human capital and asset management decisions are significantly affected by geographic disper-
sion, whereas Kang and Kim (2008) provide evidence that geographic proximity affects corporate
acquisition decisions. Although geographic concentration could refer to the level of concentration
or dispersion in business lines, asset types, or geographic locations, its measurement is difficult,
particularly for firms with a larger percentage of intangible assets such as patents, licenses, and
intellectual capital.
A diversification discount is also documented in a number of empirical CRE studies (Campbell
et al., 2003; Capozza & Seguin, 1999; Cronqvist et al., 2001; Hartzell et al., 2014; Ling, Naranjo, &
Scheick, 2019), which find that returns are lower for REITs with more geographically diversified
portfolios—that is, a strategy of concentrated underlying assets contributes to a return premium.
Following this stream of literature, one might also argue that, other than the investment recog-
nition channel, geographic locations could also affect IPO performance via a diversification dis-
count channel. Investors in the secondary market would require higher returns for REIT IPOs
with higher geographic concentrations to compensate for increased investment risks. However,
Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that IPO underpricing is an anomaly observed on the first day of
trading, not on the second day and thereafter. Fundamental valuation or asset-pricing theories
based on risk premia are unlikely to explain excess initial returns. If investors on the first day of
trading require higher returns for bearing greater risks associated with geographic concentration,
why would investors on the second, third, and following days of trading not require the same
return premium? Therefore, our second hypothesis argues that the positive effect of geographic
concentration on REIT IPO returns is unlikely to be driven by a diversification discount effect:
5 See García and Norli (2012) for a list of related studies.
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Hypothesis 2: Geographic concentration affects the initial returns of REIT IPOs via an
investor recognition rather than a diversification discount channel.
Chan et al. (2013) conduct the first cross-country study of REIT IPOs using a sample of 370
REIT IPOs from 14 countries. Using univariate tests, they identify several factors related to initial
returns. However, their univariate tests are not robust enough to identify the underlying dynamics
of real estate IPO pricing. Furthermore, as all previous explanations seem insufficient to explain
REIT IPOperformance, Chan et al. (2013) argue that the deadweight costmodel proposed byChan
et al. (2009) represents the most suitable explanation because it does not require an assumption
of information asymmetry and is consistent with competing theories. When U.S. REITs became
more similar to typical operating companies in the late 1980s, the deadweight costs of IPOs also
increased and this may at least partially explain the shift from negative average returns to positive
initial returns. Chan et al. (2009) do not empirically test the impact of deadweight costs on IPO
underpricing because of the challenge of finding an adequate proxy.
It is important to note that our investor base argument is consistent with the deadweight cost
theory. If the investor base (recognition) of REIT IPOs increases with increased geographic diver-
sification, selling underlying assets in the private market becomes easier and cheaper (as search
costs are reduced). However, we argue that, holding the level of geographic concentration and
other factors constant, REITs investing in more liquid private real estate markets could under-
price shares less because they are able to sell their underlying assets in the private market rela-
tively quickly and cost effectively should the IPO fail. Therefore, we formulate our third testable
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The impact of geographic concentration on IPO initial returns is weakened
when returns and liquidity (transaction turnover) in the private market are higher (i.e.,
the deadweight cost is lower).
3 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Our sample includes 183 U.S. equity REIT IPOs issued from 1995 to 2017 and is collected from
the Security Data Company (SDC) New Issues database.6 We only include IPOs with informa-
tion on the offer price and first-trading-day closing price as both are required to calculate initial
returns. Firm- and issuing-level characteristics (e.g., venture capital status, pricing technique, and
offer size) are also sourced from the SDC New Issues database. Control variables for general mar-
ket conditions at the time of the IPO (e.g., pre-IPO market return and turnover) are obtained
from Thomson Reuters DataStream. The total return on the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) is
included to control for conditions and returns in the private CRE market.7 The NCREIF quar-
terly transaction database is also used to compute volume- and size-based turnover as proxies for
liquidity in the private CREmarket. Our property type and geographic concentration variables are
6Mortgage REITs are not included in this study because they have very different IPO valuation and performance.
7 Established in 1982, NCREIF (National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries) is a not-for-profit institutional
real estate industry association that collects, processes, validates, and disseminates information on the risk/return char-
acteristics of commercial real estate assets owned by institutional (primarily pension and endowment fund) investors.
The property composition of the NPI changes quarterly as data contributing NCREIF members buy and sell properties.
However, all historical property-level data remain in the database and index.
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manually extracted from the IPO prospectus, the 10-K fillings for the IPO year, or the S&PMarket
Intelligence (formerly SNL Financials Property) database.
The IPO initial return (IR) is computed as the difference between the closing price on the first
trading day (hereafter the close price) and the IPO offer price, as a percentage of the offer price.
To control for general movements in the stock market, we adjust the initial return by subtracting
the market return on the first day of trading8:
Initial return =(Close price − Offer price)Of fer price − Market return (%) . (1)
We construct two Herfindahl indexes to measure geographic and property type (or sector) port-
folio concentration.We first calculate the share of each firm’s properties in each state bymanually
extracting information on the size (square footage) of CRE holdings in that state at the time of its
IPO. For asset types (e.g., hotels, healthcare centers and multifamily communities) where the
property size is not reported in square feet, other size measurements (e.g., number of rooms or
units) are used. Similarly, we collect information on the value of each property and calculate the
percentage of assets in each state for each property type.9 For hotel assets (where property values
are not reported), we use the product of the average daily room rate, the number of rooms, and
the average occupancy rate as weights.10 The Herfindahl index for geographic and property type
concentration (HHI_GEO andHHO_ASSET, respectively) is computed as the sum of the squared
proportions:




where 𝑃𝑖 represents the proportion of properties the company owns in a state or of an asset type
and n is the total number of states or property types inwhich the company invests. TheHerfindahl
index can range from 0 to 10,000, with higher values representing higher levels of concentration.
For estimation purposes, we scale both indexes by 10,000, leaving a possible range between 0
and 1.
We also construct a Herfindahl index for each IPO company by grouping properties into the
eight economic regions defined by Hartzell, Shulman, and Wurtzebach (1987).11 This alternative
concentration index allows us to test the robustness of our state-based measure of geographical
concentration.
8 Unlike studies of industrial IPOs, the subtraction of the market return has a greater impact on REIT IPO returns because
of the relatively low underpricing of REIT IPOs. We also estimate models without adjusting for the market return and the
results hold.
9 The data on property size and value are manually collected from the IPO Prospectuses. Given that not all IPO companies
reports detailed information on their initial property portfolios, we lose some observations. Our final sample contains 137
IPOs that report geographic information and 118 IPOs that report property type information.
10 Values by property type are not reported for Select Income REIT; thus, we divide the total value of properties by the
number of property types and use the average to calculate Herfindahl index. We use the size of properties for Boston
Properties Inc. and Prime Group Realty Trust because the value of portfolio properties is not reported. We also estimate
our models excluding these three IPOs and find that the results do not change significantly.
11 Hartzell, Shulman, and Wurtzebach (1987) divide the 50 US states into eight regions according to their underlying
economies: New England, Mid-Atlantic Corridor, Old South, Industrial Midwest, Farm Belt, Mineral Extraction Area,
South California and North California.
LING et al. 9
As a further robustness check, we use alternative measures of geographic and property type
concentration. First, we include the total number of states in which the IPO company holds prop-
erties. The use of state-counts of investment activities (LSTATES) to determine the extent towhich
a firm’s economic interests are concentrated is consistent with similar variables constructed by
Bernile et al. (2015) and García and Norli (2012), who count the number of times a state is men-
tioned in a firm’s annual financial statements. We also create a dummy variable,HEAD, which is
set equal to 1 if the headquarters state of the company is also home to the largest share of proper-
ties. This variable therefore also proxies for a REIT’s “home bias” (García & Norli, 2012 and Ling
et al., 2019). Note that, unlike HHI_GEO, LSTATESmeasures diversification, not concentration.
Finally, we compute the average distance between each state in which the company owns prop-
erties and its headquarters state. We construct both a simple andweighted average distance (DIST
and DIST_W, respectively); for the latter, the share of the total size of properties in each state is
used to weight the distance. More specifically,








where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance (in miles) between state 𝑖 in which company 𝑗 owns properties and the
headquarters state of company 𝑗, n is the total number of states where company 𝑗 holds properties,
and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the percentage of the portfolio that company 𝑗 owns in state 𝑖. Similar to LSTATES,DIST
and DIST_W are measures of geographic dispersion (rather than concentration).
As far as property type concentration is concerned, we construct two alternative measures to
the main Herfindahl index (HHO_ASSET): a dummy variable (FOCUSED) that is set equal to 1
if the firm invests in just one property type (and 0 otherwise), and the total number of property
types owned by the REIT (LASSET), which proxies for portfolio diversification.
The direct measurement of the deadweight cost of an IPO is not straightforward. Therefore, to
control for general conditions in the private property market, we use the one-quarter lag of the
quarterly NCREIF NPI return (NCREIF) and private market liquidity (LIQUIDITY) as proxies for
the IPO’s deadweight costs. LIQUIDITY is defined as the transaction value (in dollar terms) of
properties sold from the NCREIF index in a quarter as a share of the market value in the quarter
before the IPO. Furthermore, to test the robustness of our results, we also use alternativemeasures
of private market conditions, including annual NCREIF returns, a 4-quarter moving average of
turnover, and portfolio-weighted state-level liquidity.
The IPOmarket in states where the underlying properties of an IPO are located could also affect
company valuations in at least two ways: First, the information environment of the property port-
folio may affect the uncertainty of the overall valuation of an IPO. Second, the overall availability
of IPO investment opportunities could impact investor demand. Therefore, we construct DEN-
SITY, which measures the weighted state-level IPO investment environment for REIT companies
in our sample. The weights are the geographical composition of each REIT’s real estate portfolio.
Specifically,DENSITY is set equal to the number of IPO firms that are headquartered in each state
in its IPO year divided by the state population in that year, and then weighted by the proportion
of the real estate portfolio in each state.
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We also include firm- andmarket-level control variables in our estimations. To capture informa-
tion asymmetry in IPO valuation, we use the IPO proceeds as a proxy for firm size, as suggested by
Beaty andRitter (1986).We also include a dummyvariable that indicates the use of a book-building
pricing technique (BB) and a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO is backed by a venture
capital firm (VB).12 To control for general stock market movements, we use the 3-month cumula-
tive market return (based on the DataStream all-stock market index) prior to the IPO date.13 We
also alter the measure developed by Banerjee, Dai, and Shrestha (2011) to construct HOTRATIO,
which is computed as the ratio of the number of IPOs in the IPO year to the total number of IPOs
across the sample period.HOTRATIO represents another control for current market conditions.14
For ease of reference, Table 1 contains the definitions of all variables included in this study and
associated data sources.
Table 2 presents summary statistics. The averagemarket-adjusted initial return for our full sam-
ple (183 IPOs) is 3.48%. This is slightly greater than the average initial return of 2.79% for REIT
IPOs reported by Chan et al. (2013) for 1996–2010 and less than the 5.34% average initial return
between 1993 and 2007 documented by Gokkaya, Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2015). These
relatively low average initial returns support the notion that REIT IPOs are materially different
from industrial IPOs. For example, according to Ritter (2018), the average initial returns of U.S.
industrial IPOs are above 0 across our sample period, with aminimum of 6.4% in 2008 and amax-
imum of 56.4% in 2000. In contrast, the minimum initial return in our sample is –12.7%, whereas
the maximum is 45.8%, with a standard deviation of 9.3%.
As expected, only a fewREIT IPOs are backed by venture capital firms and themajority of REIT
IPOs use a bookbuilding technique to price their shares. The average total IPO proceeds (LSIZE,
log-transformed) is $265.85 million, a value similar to the average industrial IPO size reported
in Ritter (2018) for the 1999–2015 period. Furthermore, 21 of the 137 companies with available
geographic information hold all their investments in one state, producing a HHI_GEO of 1. In
contrast, only six IPO companies invest in more than half of the U.S. states. In addition, among
the 137 REITs, 61 companies hold the largest percentage of their portfolios in the state where they
are headquartered, indicating a substantial home bias. Finally, 96 of 118 REITs with available asset
type data invest solely in one property type.
Following the IPO literature, we first conduct a multivariate analysis to test the effects of geo-
graphic and property type concentrations on initial returns by estimating the following models:
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (5)
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖. (6)
12Most U.S. studies published in the 1990s find that IPOs backed by venture capital firms experience lower levels of IPO
underpricing. However, more recent U.S.-based studies, as well as many international studies, such as Guo, Lev, and Shi
(2006), have recorded mixed results.
13 According to Prospect Theory (Loughran & Ritter, 2002), the initial return is positively related to the pre-IPO market
return, which captures market sentiment.
14 The “Hot Issue” theory, first proposed byRitter (1984), posits that IPOs issued in a period of rising stock prices experience
higher initial returns.
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TABLE 2 Summary statistics
Variables Mean Median Min Max SD N
IR 3.48 0.74 −13.21 45.84 9.21 183
VB 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 137
BB 0.99 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 137
LSIZE 5.22 5.33 1.61 7.88 1.03 137
MRETURN 5.23 4.77 −15.84 34.35 6.23 137
HOTRATIO 5.20 5.34 1.16 10.50 2.08 137
NCREIF 2.77 2.76 −7.33 5.34 1.47 137
NCREIF_W 2.78 2.90 −7.42 5.62 1.50 137
NCREIF_ROLL 10.10 10.61 −21.29 18.07 5.93 137
LIQUIDITY 2.79 2.63 0.46 5.80 1.34 137
LIQUIDITY_AVG 2.54 2.34 0.44 4.30 0.99 137
LIQUIDITY_W_V 2.06 1.72 0.00 9.52 1.67 113
LIQUIDITY_W_N 2.33 2.24 0.00 10.71 1.74 113
DENSITY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 137
HEAD 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 137
LSTATES 1.69 1.79 0.00 3.76 1.00 137
DIST 972.10 1029.00 0.00 2913.00 625.50 137
DIST_W 885.60 941.50 0.00 3161.00 646.00 137
HHI_GEO 0.40 0.29 0.05 1.00 0.31 137
HHI_GEO_ECO 0.47 0.38 0.05 1.00 0.30 137
FOCUSED 0.81 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 118
LASSET 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.61 0.40 118
HHI_ASSET 0.93 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.16 118
URBAN 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 116
GATEWAY 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 116
TRANSPARENT 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 116
CORE 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 103
Note. This table presents descriptive statistics of firm-, issuing-, and market-level characteristics as well as the concentration mea-
sures for geographic locations and property types for the full sample of equity REITs during the 1995–2017 sample period. Variable
definitions and data sources are contained in Table 1.
The dependent variable in both equations is the IPO firm’s initial return (IRi) and 𝛽1 captures
the effect of either geographic (HHI_GEOi) or property type (HHI_ASSETi) concentration.𝑉𝑖 rep-
resents a vector ofm control variables as outlined above.
We next include both dimensions of concentration and estimate our model using both 3-year
(to save degrees of freedom) and 1-year time fixed effects as follows:
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖. (7)
As discussed above, the investor recognition channel suggests that excess initial returns are
the result of the underpricing of offering shares, whereas the diversification discount channel
suggests that excess initial returns are driven by investor demand in the aftermarket. Therefore,
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to test our second hypothesis that geographic concentration affects initial IPO returns through
an investor recognition rather than diversification discount channel, we compute both pre- and
post-IPO returns around the issuance. The pre-IPO return is measured as the difference between
the opening price on the first trading day and the offer price as a percentage of the offer price. The
post-IPO return is measured as the difference between the closing and opening prices of the first
trading day as a percentage of the opening price. Following Equation (1), both pre- and post-IPO
returns are adjusted by the corresponding market return, as presented in Equation (8) and (9):
pre-IPO = (Open price − Offer price)Of fer price −
(Market at open −Market at of fer)
Market at of fer , (8)
post-IPO IR = (Close price − Open price)Open price −
(Market at close − Market at open)
Market at open . (9)
If the pricing effect of geographic concentration is transmitted via the investor recognition
channel, we should observe its impact on pre-IPO IR. However, if a diversification discount chan-
nel exists, we should observe its impact on post-IPO IR. We test this hypothesis by estimating
Equations (10) and (11):
𝑝𝑟𝑒-𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (10)
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟-𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐼𝑅1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖. (11)
As a final step, we test whether less underpricing occurs in periods when the underlying real
estate assets can be sold more easily and efficiently (Hypothesis 3) by interacting the geographic
concentration measure with each of the deadweight cost indicators. Therefore, the variable of
interest in this specification is the interaction between geographic concentration (HHI_GEO) and
the private CREmarket performance, which is proxied for by the lagged private real estate market
return and liquidity (NCREIF andLIQUIDITY, respectively). Positive conditions in the underlying
CREmarket shouldmoderate the impact of geographic concentration on REIT IPO initial returns
(i.e., β3 is expected to be negative). The augmented specifications are presented in Equations (12a)
and (12b).
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 𝑋 𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐹𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, (12a)
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖 𝑋 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 +
𝑚∑
𝑗 = 𝑖
𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖. (12b)
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Table 3 reports the results from estimating the baseline model and Equation (5). Property type
concentration is excluded in this initial set of estimations. Robust standard errors are reported
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TABLE 3 Results on the effect of geographic concentration
Dependent variable: IR (Baseline) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VB −5.372** −4.390* −5.115*** −4.445* −5.196** −4.800*
2.288 2.473 1.949 2.494 2.462 2.656
BB −8.995 −9.019 −8.682 −8.883 −9.682 −9.641
7.746 8.117 6.687 8.123 6.034 6.861
LSIZE 1.364 1.630 1.344 1.642 1.471 1.576
1.207 1.172 1.192 1.177 1.182 1.211
MRETURN 0.414** 0.448*** 0.421** 0.447*** 0.420** 0.432***
0.161 0.154 0.164 0.156 0.163 0.158
HOTRATIO −0.172 −0.453 −0.659 −0.560 −0.585 −0.676
0.690 0.558 0.563 0.576 0.550 0.574
NCREIF 1.064** 1.151** 1.243** 1.209*** 1.017** 1.082**
0.482 0.446 0.483 0.458 0.485 0.49
LIQUIDITY −0.600 −0.468 −0.324 −0.519 −0.331 −0.380
0.755 0.744 0.734 0.754 0.749 0.764
DENSITY −5,258* −6,533** −5,861** −5,844** −5,177** −4,975*











Constant 4.003 2.217 4.627 6.216 7.012 6.029
9.379 9.578 8.383 9.759 8.190 8.656
Time fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 141 137 137 137 137 137
R-squared .203 .267 .249 .255 .254 .245
Note. The table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in the
United States. Dependent variable IR is the market-adjusted initial return of the IPO. Other variable definitions and data sources
are in Table 1. Three-year time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected for robustness and presented below the
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
below the coefficients.With 137 IPOs in our sample, we first use 3-year time fixed effect to preserve
degrees of freedom. The use of annual market-level control variables (e.g., equity return, hot ratio,
real estate returns, and liquidity) also helps to control for unobservable time-dependent factors.15
15We also estimate themodel with 1-year time fixed effects and present our findings in the robustness tests section. Results
are largely unchanged.
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The results for the baseline model that includes only firm-, issuing-, andmarket-level variables
are reported in the first column of Table 3 (Baseline). As expected, we find that real estate IPOs
backed by venture capital firms (VB) are associated with significantly lower initial returns. This
is consistent with Megginson and Weiss (1991) who argue that venture capitalists play a certifi-
cation role that reduces IPO valuation uncertainty. We find no evidence that initial returns are
associated with the size of the offering (LSIZE) or the use of book building (BB), which is in sharp
contrast to the findings of most empirical studies on industrial IPOs. As both firm size and the
book building method are commonly used proxies for information asymmetry, this result is con-
sistent with our argument that classic information asymmetry-based theories have little ability to
explain the cross-sectional variation of initial returns of REIT IPOs (Brounen & Eichholtz, 2002;
Wong et al., 2013). This result further confirms our motivation to explore the relation between
REIT IPO performance and real estate-specific factors.
The estimated coefficient on the broad-based stock market return in the 3 months prior to the
IPO (MRETURN) is positive and highly significant, indicating higher initial returns in rising mar-
kets. This finding supports behavioral explanations of IPO underpricing (Ljungqvist, Nanda, &
Singh, 2006; Loughran & Ritter, 2002), which argue that IPO short-run performance is driven, at
least in part, by investor sentiment. However, we find no evidence that IPO returns are associ-
ated with IPO waves (HOTRATIO). Although classic IPO theories are unable to account for the
performance of REIT IPOs, the explanatory power of behavioral arguments appears strong.
The inclusion of MRETURN controls for the recent performance of the general stock market.
However, we also examine whether REIT IPO performance is driven by the recent performance
of the underlying private real estate market by including the total return of the NCREIF Property
Index (NCREIF) in the quarter prior to the IPO. The estimated coefficient on NCREIF is posi-
tive and significant at a 5% level, suggesting that the recent performance of the private real estate
market is predictive of higher first-day IPO returns, even after controlling for recent stock mar-
ket returns. This implies that the REIT IPO market is affected by industry-related investor senti-
ment (general real estate market conditions under which the company is listed). A 10% increase
in the broad stock market return or the private real estate market return over the prior quarter is
associated with a 4.14% and 10.64% increase in the IPO initial return, respectively. The estimated
coefficient on LIQUIDITY is not significantly different from 0 in any specification, suggesting that
liquidity in the underlying privatemarket is not, at themargin, associatedwith initial IPO returns.
Our first explanatory variable related to geography—DENSITY—proxies for the REIT-level
information environment where a REIT’s IPO properties are located. Increased DENSITY indi-
cates more IPO investments (i.e., greater investors base) in areas where the REIT holds its prop-
erties and a better information environment for its real estate portfolio. We find that informa-
tion sharing among investors—through a higher concentration of IPOs in the portfolio states—
becomes more efficient, therefore reducing IPO initial returns. This also supports Altı’s (2005)
information spillover argument, with the revelation of an unknown common factor in previous
IPOs being reflected in subsequent IPO valuations.
Wenow turn to the results for our primary variable of interest, geographical concentration. Esti-
mation results using primary and alternative measures of geographic concentration are presented
in Models (1) to (5). The estimated coefficient on our primary proxy, HHI_GEO, is positive and
highly significant inModel (1). Economically, a 10% increase inHHI_GEO leads to a 0.51% increase
in underpricing, a significant portion of the overall average of 3.48%. Models (3), (4), and (5) use
different measures of dispersion (rather than concentration) and the significantly negative coef-
ficients confirm that geographic diversification may improve investor recognition, allowing IPO
companies to underprice less. These three models use the number of states in which the IPO firm
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owns properties (LSTATES), the weighted average distance (DIST_W) between each asset’s loca-
tion and the company’s headquarters state, and the unweighted (DIST) average distance. Finally,
the Model (2) results reveal a weakly significant home bias, with investors requiring REITs with
concentrations in their headquarters states to underpricemore to attract a larger pool of investors.
Overall, the results reported in Table 3 support the existence of an investor recognition channel.
Highly concentrated REITs suffer from a smaller pool of investors and need to underpricemore to
increase investor recognition (García&Norli, 2012). Note that this result does not assume informa-
tion asymmetry within the real estate industry, where the phenomenon of overpricing may often
occur.When a real estate company’s portfolio is highly geographically diversified with amore dis-
persed investor base (i.e., it is well-recognized), the issuer has less incentive to underprice the IPO.
Table 4 reports the impact of property type concentration on IPO initial returns (with geo-
graphic concentration excluded from the analysis). Model (1) reports results using the Herfindahl
index as a proxy for asset type concentration (HHI_ASSET). The positive and significant (10%
level) coefficient provides some support for the notion that increased property type specialization
is associated with greater underpricing. On average, a 10% increase in property type concentra-
tion results in a 0.58% increase in first-day IPO returns. The estimated coefficients on FOCUSED
in Model (2) and LASSET in Model (3) confirm our main result that increased portfolio concen-
tration requires issuers to underprice more, which is consistent with the findings of Brounen and
Eichholtz (2002). The impact of stock market returns (MRETURN) on initial returns is still posi-
tive and significant in all three specifications, whereas the effect of market waves on REIT under-
pricing (HOTRATIO) remains insignificant. IPO initial returns in high-performing CRE markets
(NCREIF) continue to be higher and IPOs still generally benefit from venture capital backing.
The density of IPO activity within the headquarters state (DENSITY) is associated with reduced
underpricing.
Although our property type results are robust to the use of alternative measures, they are
slightly weaker than our corresponding findings for geographic concentration. Because the
Herfindahl index is a more precise measure of concentration, we will report results using this
measure in the remainder of the paper. We have also estimated models using other measures and
our findings are consistent.
Table 5 reports the main results for model specifications including both geographic and prop-
erty type concentration (HHI_GEO and HHI_ASSET). Three-year time fixed effects are included
in Models (1) and (2); 1-year fixed effects are included in Models (3) and (4). We also introduce
a second measure of underlying private market returns (NCREIF_W) to account for variation
in the location of portfolio properties. NCREIF produces total private market return indices for
U.S. properties located in four geographic regions: East, West, South, and Midwest. To create
NCREIF_W, we weight the total returns in these four NCREIF regions by the distribution of the
firm’s IPO assets across these regions to obtain a firm-specific measure of the strength of the pri-
vate CREmarkets in which the company invests. We confirm our main results as both the magni-
tude and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates on NCREIF_W in Models (2) and (4)
are similar to the results obtained with our original proxy for private market returns (NCREIF) in
Models (1) and (3).
We find consistent evidence of an economically meaningful relation between geographic con-
centration and IPO underpricing. A 10% increase in the Herfindahl index is associated with a
0.59-0.77% increase in IPO initial returns. The estimated coefficients on HHI_ASSET are slightly
larger in magnitude, although less statistically significant than the corresponding estimates for
HHI_GEO. Lagged private market returns have a positive and significant impact on initial returns
for the specifications with 3-year time fixed effect. However, they become insignificant when
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TABLE 4 Results on the effect of property type concentration
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3)
VB −4.808* −5.047* −4.768*
2.842 2.750 2.776
BB −9.172 −9.150 −9.122
7.931 7.852 7.875
LSIZE 1.582 1.599 1.571
1.313 1.311 1.316
MRETURN 0.451** 0.437** 0.444***
0.173 0.168 0.169
HOTRATIO −0.258 −0.270 −0.282
0.698 0.699 0.699
NCREIF 1.249** 1.229** 1.242**
0.604 0.615 0.607
LIQUIDITY −0.811 −0.783 −0.741
0.985 0.984 0.985








Constant −0.484 2.888 5.268
10.53 10.19 10.21
Time fixed effect Y Y Y
Observations 118 118 118
R-squared .243 .244 .246
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in theUnited States. Dependent
variable IR is the market-adjusted initial return of the IPO. Variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year time
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
1-year time fixed effects are included because the time variation of conditions in the underlying
market is already captured. The equity market return over the previous 3 months—MRETURN—
remains positive and highly significant evenwhen 1-year time fixed effects are included. This sup-
ports the argument that the listed stockmarket has a stronger influence on short-termmovements
in REIT share prices than the private CRE market. A greater DENSITY of IPOs in states where
a REIT invests remains predictive of lower first-day returns. The effect of market waves on REIT
underpricing (HOTRATIO) is negative and highly significant in the specificationswith 1-year time
fixed effects, which supports the information spillover explanation of IPO underpricing proposed
by Altı (2005). The use of 1-year time fixed effects increases the R-squared by approximately five
percentage points.
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TABLE 5 Results on the effects of geographic and property type concentration, annual fixed effect
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3) (4)
VB −3.324 −3.151 −2.262 −2.157
3.080 3.042 3.407 3.441
BB −8.707 −8.710 −7.723 −7.812
8.072 8.192 9.169 9.259
LSIZE 1.719 1.704 1.502 1.495
1.266 1.260 1.254 1.251
MRETURN 0.481*** 0.474*** 0.656*** 0.650***
0.167 0.164 0.243 0.246
HOTRATIO −0.541 −0.555 −3.999*** −4.010***





LIQUIDITY −0.428 −0.487 −0.602 −0.679
0.936 0.931 0.962 0.990
DENSITY −5,899** −6,140** −7,695*** −7,661***
2598 2586 2862 2785
HHI_ASSET 7.496** 7.376** 6.639* 6.744*
3.233 3.228 3.485 3.452
HHI_GEO 5.454*** 5.307*** 6.293*** 6.260***
1.992 1.965 2.316 2.305
Constant −5.305 −4.863 −22.35 −18.79
10.44 10.55 17.35 16.01
Time fixed effect (3-year) Y Y N N
Time fixed effect (1-year) N N Y Y
Observations 116 116 116 116
R-squared .298 .301 .373 .374
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in the United States. Depen-
dent variable IR is the market-adjusted initial return of the IPO. Variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year
time fixed effects are included in Models (1) and (2). Annual fixed effects are included in Models (3) and (4). Standard errors
are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
4.1 Investors recognition versus diversification discount channel
To test our second hypothesis that the positive effect of geographic concentration on IPO initial
day returns is transmitted via an investor base channel rather than a diversification discount effect,
we divide the initial returns of IPOs into pre- and post-listing returns and estimate Equations (10)
and (11). These results are reported in Table 6. Models (1) and (2) use raw returns; Models (3) and
(4) use market-adjusted returns.
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TABLE 6 Results on the effect of geographic concentration on pre- and post-IPO initial returns
Pre-IPO IR Post-IPO IR Adjusted pre-IPO IR Adjusted after-IPO IR
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3) (4)
VB −3.485* −0.139 −2.907* −0.329
1.896 1.438 1.668 1.534
BB −14.20 2.082 −14.43 1.724
8.841 1.294 8.876 1.474
LSIZE 2.856*** −0.022 2.875*** −0.025
0.562 0.282 0.563 0.300
MRETURN 0.190** 0.049 0.195** 0.052
0.091 0.046 0.091 0.050
HOTRATIO −0.386 0.067 −0.392 0.069
0.465 0.226 0.464 0.238
NCREIF 0.753*** 0.156 0.770*** 0.349*
0.284 0.175 0.276 0.197
LIQUIDITY 0.447 −0.144 0.440 −0.139
0.547 0.253 0.546 0.260
DENSITY −4,163** −175.5 −4,126** 104.0
1,987 966.0 1,971 1,004
HHI_ASSET 2.067 0.619 2.041 0.340
2.445 1.466 2.474 1.540
HHI_GEO 4.642** −1.132 4.709*** −1.247
1.769 0.784 1.765 0.838
Constant −1.963 −1.824 −1.791 −1.806
9.920 2.512 9.962 2.847
Time fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared .417 .130 .422 .114
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in the United States. The
dependent variable in Models (1) and (3) is Pre-IPO IR, which is the return between the offer price and first-trading day open-
ing price and its market-adjusted form (Adj Pre-IPO IR), respectively. The dependent variable in Models (2) and (4) is After-IPO
IR which is the return between the first-trading day opening and closing price and its market-adjusted form (Adj Pre-IPO IR),
respectively. Other variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year time fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Overall, the results for our control variables are consistent with our main findings. The degree
of geographic concentration (HHI_GEO) has a significant impact on pre-IPO initial returns in
Models (1) and (3); however, no significant relation is observed in the post-IPO regressions in
Models (2) and (4). These results strongly support our second hypothesis that the geographic
concentration of a firm’s underlying assets impacts IPO returns by affecting the pre-IPO pric-
ing/valuation via an investor base channel rather than affecting aftermarket trading via a diversi-
fication discount channel.
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4.2 The moderation effect of deadweight costs
We next test the moderating effects of lower deadweight costs associated with an IPO on the
relationship between geographic concentration and IPO performance. This test is performed by
including an interaction term betweenHHI_GEO and a proxy for the ease with which underlying
real estate assets can be sold in the private market—lagged NCREIF returns in Models (1) and (2)
and real estate market liquidity inModels (3) and (4) of Table 7.16 The coefficient estimates on our
control variables remain largely unchanged and the coefficient estimate on HHI_GEO remains
positive and highly significant. Moreover, a consistently negative and significant interaction term
(HHI_GEO×NCREIF andHHI_GEOxLIQUIDITY) suggests that high-performing and liquid pri-
vate real estate markets offer companies the opportunity to underprice less because of a reduction
in deadweight issuing costs. The use of either lagged returns or liquidity to signal the presence of
a strong underlying private market does not affect our findings, which are also robust to the use of
either 3- or 1-year time fixed effects. Overall, these results provide support for our third hypothesis
that reduced deadweight costs have a both economically and statistically significant moderating
effect on the relationship between geographic concentration and REIT IPO returns.
4.3 Alternative definition of geographic concentration
The possibility that variation in underlying regional economies could affect asset values and IPO
valuations may represent a potential concern with our main results. To examine whether the
impact of geographic concentration on IPO valuations is channeled through the underlying eco-
nomic structure of geography rather than an investors base recognition, we construct an alterna-
tive Herfindahl index (HHI_GEO_ECO) based on the eight economic regions defined by Hartzell
et al. (1987).We then re-estimate our baseline regressions and report the results in Table 8. The esti-
mated impact of the geographic concentration on IPO initial returns remains positive, although
statistical significance is slightly reduced when 3-year time fixed effects are included. However,
when 1-year time fixed effects are included—Models (3) and (4)—property type concentration
(HHI_ASSET) is no longer significant, suggesting that the performance of underlying property
types may be correlated with the performance of the regional economies where properties are
located. Overall, we conclude that controlling for the underlying economic structure of geograph-
ical areas does not weaken our investor base argument.
4.4 Alternative proxies for deadweight costs
The performance of private real estatemarkets can be seasonal. To testwhether our quarterlymea-
sures of privatemarket conditions capture the latent deadweight costs associated with REIT IPOs,
we use alternative proxies for private market returns and liquidity. Specifically, we use an annual
(four-quarter cumulative) return of the NCREIF NPI Index Return (NCREIF_ROLL) and a four-
quarter moving average of turnover in the NCREIF NPI property database (LIQUIDITY_AVG)
to account for seasonality. The results reported in Table 9 confirm the robustness of our finding
16Models (1) and (2) estimate Equation (12a) with 3-year and annual time fixed effects, respectively, whereas Models (3)
and (4) estimate Equation (12b) with 3-year and annual time fixed effects, respectively.
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TABLE 7 Results on the moderation effect of the deadweight cost indicators
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3) (4)
VB −3.813 −2.993 −2.414 −1.378
3.517 3.989 2.615 3.126
BB −8.857 −7.889 −8.192 −6.918
8.302 9.380 8.211 9.295
LSIZE 1.880 1.690 1.824 1.594
1.239 1.253 1.224 1.218
MRETURN 0.513*** 0.678*** 0.490*** 0.653***
0.169 0.241 0.162 0.237
HOTRATIO −0.447 −4.049*** −0.495 −4.294***
0.583 0.644 0.587 0.679
NCREIF 2.163** 0.777 1.069** −0.369
0.836 1.150 0.456 1.232
LIQUIDITY −0.431 −0.566 1.112 0.935
0.937 0.983 1.066 1.277
DENSITY −6,275** −7,834*** −5,613** −7,553***
2631 2832 2595 2815
HHI_ASSET 8.328** 7.477** 9.648*** 8.868**
3.374 3.632 3.457 3.707
HHI_GEO 15.77** 16.55** 15.74*** 16.94***
6.261 6.401 5.760 6.105
HHI_GEO × NCREIF −3.687* −3.656*
2.063 2.113
HHI_GEO × LIQUIDITY −3.801** −3.858*
1.893 1.942
Constant −14.75 −9.562 −17.28 −11.43
10.66 11.10 10.43 11.19
Time fixed effect (3-year) Y N Y N
Time fixed effect (1-year) N Y N Y
Observations 116 116 116 116
R-squared .312 .385 .324 .398
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in theUnited States. Dependent
variable IR is the market-adjusted initial return of the IPO. The variables of interest are HHI_GEO × NCREIF and HHI_GEO ×
LIQUIDITY. Variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year time fixed effects are included in Models (1) and (3).
Annual fixed effects are included in Models (2) and (4). Standard errors are corrected for robustness and presented below the
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
of a moderating effect of deadweight costs on the investors base recognition channel. The inter-
action term between geographic concentration and the two new proxies of deadweight costs
(NCREIF_ROLL and LIQUIDITY_AVG) remain statistically and economically statistically signifi-
cant. Finally, in Model (3) the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term is smaller than
in Models (1) and (2) from Table 7, but this is because the new proxy is represented by an annual
rather than quarterly return. In fact, its economic significance does not change.
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TABLE 8 Results on the effect of geographic concentration by economic regions
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3) (4)
VB −3.994 −3.820 −3.054 −2.885
3.087 3.066 3.450 3.503
BB −9.149 −9.146 −8.639 −8.748
6.973 7.126 7.886 8.007
LSIZE 1.734 1.717 1.584 1.579
1.324 1.316 1.299 1.296
MRETURN 0.468*** 0.464*** 0.641** 0.632**
0.170 0.167 0.250 0.253
HOTRATIO −0.585 −0.604 −3.947*** −3.976***





LIQUIDITY −0.408 −0.479 −0.472 −0.569
0.954 0.951 0.951 0.979
DENSITY −5,488** −5,748** −6,935** −6,945**
2617 2578 2876 2777
HHI_ASSET 5.830* 5.771* 4.863 5.004
3.108 3.099 3.277 3.258
HHI_GEO_ECO 3.895* 3.826* 5.193** 5.252**
2.027 2.001 2.273 2.250
Constant −3.367 −3.016 −18.25 −13.72
10.12 10.24 17.50 15.60
Time fixed effect (3-year) Y Y N N
Time fixed effect (1-year) N N Y Y
Observations 116 116 116 116
R-squared .276 .281 .353 .355
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in theUnited States. Dependent
variable IR is the market-adjusted initial return of the IPO. Variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year time
fixed effects are included inModels (1) and (2). Annual fixed effects are included inModels (3) and (4). Standard errors are corrected
for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
As market conditions differ by region, the deadweight cost of an IPO might be sensitive to the
geographic distribution of its portfolio. Therefore, we create a measure of liquidity by location as
a robustness test. We use a company-specific deadweight cost proxy (instead of LIQUIDITY) by
weighting the state-level market liquidity based on either the value of the properties sold or the
number of sold properties. Specifically, for a given IPO, we weight state-level transaction turnover
based on the dollar transaction values by the shares of property assets of the IPO company in
each state (LIQUIDITY_W_V). Similarly, we create another weighted liquidity measure (LIQUID-
ITY_W_N) by weighting state-level turnover based on the number of transacted properties by the
shares of property assets of the IPO company in each state. The results are reported in Table 10.
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TABLE 9 Alternative proxies for deadweight costs: Averaged market performance
Dependent variable: IR (1) (2) (3) (4)
NCREIF measure NCREIF_ROLL NCREIF NCREIF_ROLL NCREIF
Liquidity measure LIQUIDITY LIQUIDITY_AVG LIQUIDITY LIQUIDITY_AVG
VB −3.026 −3.637 −3.115 −2.506
2.700 2.918 2.945 2.721
BB −8.097 −9.002 −8.278 −8.209
7.631 8.000 7.862 8.315
LSIZE 1.818 1.836 1.867 1.780
1.264 1.138 1.249 1.107
MRETURN 0.429** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.514***
0.166 0.164 0.174 0.163
HOTRATIO −0.334 −0.569 −0.327 −0.419
0.563 0.587 0.563 0.589
NCREIF Measure 0.172 1.453** 0.364** 1.212**
0.127 0.667 0.173 0.592
Liquidity Measure −0.245 −1.341 −0.288 1.126
0.913 2.020 0.920 1.672
DENSITY −5,991** −6,148** −5,969** −6,291**
2627 2578 2635 2676
HHI_ASSET 7.368** 7.004** 8.586** 9.132***
3.167 3.086 3.394 3.292
HHI_GEO 5.646*** 5.399*** 11.78*** 19.55***
2.045 1.967 3.687 7.240
HHI_GEO × NCREIF_ROLL −0.595**
0.291
HHI_GEO × LIQUIDITY_AVG −5.533**
2.505
Constant −6.037 −3.680 −14.02 −17.34
10.23 11.41 10.34 10.97
Time fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Observations 116 116 116 116
R-squared .283 .302 .296 .336
Note. The table reports OLS regressions for a cross section of real estate IPOs between 1995 and 2017 in theUnited States. Dependent
variable IR is themarket-adjusted initial return of the IPO. The variables of interest areHHI_GEO×NCREIF_ROLL andHHI_GEO
×LIQUIDITY_AVG. Variable definitions and data sources are in Table 1. Three-year time fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Models (1) and (3) use the dollar-based measure of turnover; Models (2) and (4) use the proxy
based on the number of transacted properties. Overall, we find confirmation (both statistically
and economically17) of the existence of an investor recognition channel and a moderating effect
17 Only in Model (3), the statistical significance is at the 11% level, whereas for all other coefficients the significance is at
least at the 10% level.
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of the NCREIF return (NCREIF) on IPO valuation after accounting for the regional differences
between state-level private real estate markets.
4.5 Information environment of headquarters
Weighted IPO issuance (DENSITY) and weighted liquidity (LIQUIDITY_W_V and LIQUID-
ITY_W_N) control for the information environment in markets where a REIT’s portfolio is
located. However, the information environment of the geographic areas where REITs are head-
quartered might also affect the IPO pricing because the headquarters market is where the prin-
cipal executives reside and where top management decisions take place. Therefore, we next
control for the information environment of the headquarters states as a further robustness
check.
Our sample covers a relatively long period (1995–2017); therefore, it is possible that the current
headquarters location of a REIT is different from the location at the time of the firm’s IPO. To
avoid this potential problem, wemanually extract the headquarters MSA (metropolitan statistical
area) from the IPO prospectuses for each IPO in our sample. We then construct three proxies
for the information environment of the headquarters market. First, we follow Wang, Cohen, and
Glascock (2018) and create two dummy variables, URBAN and GATEWAY. URBAN equals 1 if
the headquarters MSA of the REIT is one of the top 10 MSAs ranked by total population (based
on 2010 Census data), and 0 otherwise. GATEWAY equals 1 if the headquarters MSA of a REIT
is one of the six “gateway” MSAs: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C., and 0 otherwise. We create a third dummy, TRANSPARENT, which equals 1
if the headquarters MSA of a REIT is listed as one of the top 12 highly transparent U.S. MSAs
according to the JLL Global Real Estate Transparency Index.18
We separately include these three information measures in our main model specification—
Model (1) from Table 5. The results from estimating these augmented regressions are reported in
Table 11. In the first three models,URBAN is used as our information proxy. In Model (1), it enters
alone and then with the interaction terms HHI_GEO × NCREIF—Model (2)—and HHI_GEO ×
LIQUIDITY—Model (3). The corresponding results using GATEWAY as our information proxy
are reported in Models (4) through (6), whereas Models (7) through (9) show the results using
TRANSPARENT as our information efficiency measure.
The estimated coefficients on URBAN, GATEWAY, and TRANSPARENT are not statistically
significantly in any of the nine specifications, whereas the estimated coefficient on HHI_GEO
remains positive and highly significant, confirming our main finding that the geographic concen-
tration of a REIT’s portfolio is positively related to the IPO initial returns. Moreover, the estimated
coefficients on the interaction terms (HHI_GEO ×NCREIF andHHI_GEO× LIQUIDITY) remain
negative and significant at the 10% level or better, confirming the presence of a moderating effect
of lower deadweight costs on IPO returns.
18 JLL Global Real Estate Transparency Index is available from http://greti.jll.com/greti. The 12 U.S. MSAs ranked as
highly transparent include: LosAngeles, San Francisco, NewYork, D.C., Boston, Seattle,Miami, Chicago, Dallas, Houston,
Atlanta, and Philadelphia.
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4.6 REIT and core property type
Most REITs going public before the 2000s specialized in core properties, whereas the number of
REITs focused on specialty properties (e.g., data centers, cell towers, single-family rental property,
casinos, etc.) has increased substantially in recent years. Although we include HOTRATIO and
time fixed effects in our models to control for IPO waves, it is important to understand whether
the geographic concentration of a REIT’s portfolio might be related to its property type focus. We
therefore perform two additional robustness checks.
First, we include property type fixed effects and rerun ourmain specifications. Becausewe have
a relatively small sample of IPOs, we are not able to create a property type dummy for each prop-
erty type. Therefore, based on the distribution of property type focus in our sample, we create six
categories: diversified, industrial, office, retail, residential, and others. As we need each REIT’s
property type focus at the point of issuance, wemanually define each REIT according to the focus
reported in the IPO prospectus. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 12. The estimated coef-
ficient on HHI_GEO remains positive at the 10% level or better—Models (1) to (4). Moreover, the
interaction terms (HHI_GEO × NCREIF and HHI_GEO × LIQUIDITY) remain negative and sig-
nificant, which provides additional support for a moderating effect of lower deadweight costs on
IPO underpricing.
We next create a dummy variable (CORE), which equals 1 if the property type focus of the REIT
is one of the four core property types: office, industrial, retail, and residential. More specifically,
for each diversified REIT, CORE equals 1 if the overall weight of office, industrial, retail, and res-
idential properties in its portfolio is greater than 50%.19 We then add this variable to our main
model specifications. These results are reported in Panel B of Table 12. We initially include CORE
as an extra control variable—Model (1)—and we further add an interaction between HHI_GEO
and CORE in Models (2) to (4). None of the estimated coefficients on CORE orHHI_GEO×CORE
is significant and the estimated coefficient onHHI_GEO remains positive and significant. Overall,
these findings suggest that our main results are not driven by the property type focus of REITs.
In summary, our robustness tests confirm our main finding that geographically concentrated
REITs suffer from a smaller pool of investors and therefore their IPOs must be underpriced more
to attract sufficient subscriptions during the IPO process. We also provide some support for the
moderating effect played by deadweight costs on the relationship between geographic concentra-
tion and REIT IPO returns; that is, geographically concentrated portfolios are associated with less
underpricing in high performing real estate markets.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The listed real estate sector has generally experienced low levels of IPO underpricing relative to
industrial companies. Importantly, the sector has even produced negative average initial returns
over some time intervals. Therefore, underpricing theories based on information asymmetries
alone cannot explain the time series and cross-sectional variation in the first-day return of REIT
IPOs. Consistent with García and Norli (2012), we find evidence that the shares of geographically
focused IPO firms with smaller investor bases need to be underpriced more in order to attract the
recognition of (and subscription from) a broader base of investors, which is critical to the success
of an IPO.
19 In fact, the minimum weight of core properties for any diversified REIT in our sample is 64%.
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Our primarymeasure of geographic concentration, computed as Herfindahl index, is positively
and significantly related to IPO initial returns. The impact of geographic concentration is stronger
when the Herfindahl index is measured using the state-level property holdings of the IPO firm.
Our findings are robust to the inclusion of national and geographicallyweighted private real estate
market returns and liquidity, to the inclusion of different measures of geographic concentration
(underlying economic regions), to controlling for the information environment of a REIT’s head-
quarters, and to controlling for the property type focus of the REIT. Moreover, unlike informa-
tion asymmetry-based theories of IPO underpricing, which are unable to explain the negative
initial returns sometimes observed for REIT IPOs, our investor base argument can account for
the observed overpricing.
Our empirical results also support the deadweight cost theory of Chan et al. (2009), who argue
that issuers have less incentive to underprice shares when the underlying properties of the IPO
firm can be quickly and cost-effectively sold in the parallel private market, should the IPO fail. If
the investor base of an IPO firm increases with increasing geographic diversification, selling the
underlying property portfolio in the parallel private market becomes easier, leading to lower (or
even negative) initial returns. In support of this argument, we find that more concentrated IPO
companies experience higher IPO underpricing.
Finally, we find that our investor base argument and the deadweight cost theory complement
each other. When the private real estate market is performing well, lower deadweight costs asso-
ciated with the IPO tend to weaken the influence of geographic concentration on IPO valuations.
More specifically, geographically concentrated IPO companies produce, on average, relatively
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